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ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY LAW OF CONFESSIONS
ROBERT D. DUKE*

The Uniform Code of Military Justice,1 which became effective
in May, 1951, was enacted largely in response to the criticisms leveled
at the administration of military justice during World War I.2 The
Code reflected the prevailing feeling that military justice should be
brought more nearly into line with the criminal procedures followed
in civilian courts. To further this objective, Congress required that
in general court-martial cases legally qualified counsel be appointed to represent both the Government and the accused.3 The
position of "law officer" was created 4 and invested with much of the
authority exercised by a federal district judge in criminal cases.,
A third significant innovation was the establishment of the Court of
Military Appeals, to consist of three judges appointed from civilian
life.6 The court acts as the top appellate tribunal and has jurisdiction
to hear appeals from the decisions of service boards of review in the
more serious cases, usually involving sentences to a dishonorable or
bad conduct discharge.
The numerous changes incorporated in the Uniform Code have
spawned perplexing legal and administrative problems: To a large
extent, however, the rules of criminal evidence applicable in trials
by court-martial are similar to those generally recognized by civilian
courts, and where a wealth of civilian precedent is available, interpretive difficulties have been correspondingly reduced. On the other
hand, where the provisions of the Code are peculiar to military law,
a host of knotty problems has arisen to plague the Court of Military
Appeals. It is the purpose of this article to explore certain aspects
of the law of confessions under the Uniform Code, with a view toward
pointing out the special considerations involved and some of the difficult questions which have been presented to the Court of Military
Appeals.
*Member of the New York Bar, First Lieutenant, Judge Advocate General's
Corps, United States Army Reserve.
1. 64 STAT. 107 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 551 et seq. (1951). Hereinafter cited
as UCMJ.
2. See generally, McNiece and Thornton, Military Law from Pearl Harbor
to Korea, 22 FoRD. L. REV. 155, 157-60 (1953).
3. UCMJ art. 27 (b), 50 U.S.C.A. § 591 (b) (1951).
4. UCMJ art. 26, 50 U.S.C.A. § 590 (1951).
5. E.g., UCMJ art. 51 (b) and (c), 50 U.S.C.A. § 626 (bY and (c); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, f 39. Hereinafter cited as MC1VE
1951.
6. UCMJ art. 67, 50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1951).
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THE STATUTORY BASIS

The statutory basis for the military law of confessions and admissions is contained in Article 31 of the Uniform Code. Briefly,
Subsection (a) of this Article is a codified version of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Subsection (b) requires that persons subject to the Code warn suspects of their rights prior to conducting an interrogation, and Subsection (d) announces an exclusionary rule of
evidence with respect to involuntary confessions and violations of
Article 31. Subsection (c), setting forth a privilege against selfdegradation, is of little practical importance and will not subsequently
be discussed.
In addition to these specific provisions, Article 36(a) of the Code
-authorizes the President to prescribe "the procedure, including modes
of proof," in cases before courts-martial. This general grant of
authority is restricted by the admonition that he shall, "so far as he
deems practicable," apply the rules of evidence generally recognized
in criminal cases before the federal district courts, so long as they are
not contrary to or inconsistent with the Code. In accordance with
Article 36(a), the President has, in the Manual for Courts-Martial
1951, promulgated the rules of evidence which govern trials by courtmartial.7 Paragraph 140a of the Manual sets forth various procedural
and evidentiary rules implementing the provisions of Article 31 of
the Code; to the extent that they do not conflict with the Code, these
rules have the force and effect of statutes.8
THE ScoPE OF THE IILITARY PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMNATION

In civilian law, the privilege against self-incrimination comprehends, in principle at least, an area quite different from extra-judicial
confessions. 9 However, Article 31 (a) of the Code broadens the privi137-54. Some of the rules of evidence are contained in
7. See MCM 1951,
other parts of the Manual, as for example, in the discussions of particular
offenses under the Code. See, e.g., MCM 1951, %200a, setting forth the rules
governing proof of value in larceny cases. Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert G.
Ackroyd, with the advice of Professor Edmund M. Morgan, was primarily
responsible for drafting the rules of evidence in the 1951 Manual. The Chief
of Division was Colonel Charles L. Decker, now Commandant of the Army
Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia.
8. This conclusion, which seems clearly contemplated by Article 36(a),
has been confirmed by the Court of Military Appeals in several cases. E.g.,
United States v. Lopez-Malave, 4 USCMA 341, 15 CMR 341 (1954); United
States v. Gann, 3 USCMA 12, 11 CMR 12 (1953); United States v. Lucas, 1
USCMA 19, 1 CMR 19 (1951). Furthermore, it would seem that the determination of practicability is exclusively an executive function which cannot be
reviewed by the court. At first, the House Subcommittee on Armed Services
proposed to require that the rules of evidence be the same as those in the
federal courts, but the proposal was dropped when it was shown that the
federal rules frequently would not satisfy the special requirements of military
justice. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1014-19, 1061-64 (1949). Hereinafter cited as House Hearings.
9. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2266 (3d ed. 1940).
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lege to cover some extra-judicial statements which would, in many
civilian jurisdictions, be viewed in the light of the rules pertaining
to confessions. It is therefore desirable to indicate roughly the scope
of the military privilege as it relates to the law of confessions under
Article 31.
For thirty years prior to the enactment of the Uniform Code, the
privilege was, for the Army, guaranteed by Article of War 24.10 It
protected "witnesses" before several types of military judicial or
investigatory agencies, including courts-martial, boards, and "any
officer conducting an investigation." However, the precise meaning
of the latter phrase was not very clear. Both the 1928 and the 1949
Army Manual for Courts-Martialinterpreted it to refer to the formal
pretrial investigation required by the Articles of War before the
charges against the accused could be referred for trial by a general
court-martial.'. Also, the Judge Advocate General of the Army ruled
that the privilege applied to investigations conducted by representatives of the Inspector General, 12 and in 1949 the Army Judicial
Council, then the appellate agency of last resort, indicated that the
privilege might apply to certain other official pretrial investigations. 3
Article 31 (a) of the Code removes whatever doubt may previously
have existed on this score. It provides that "No person subject to this
code shall compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any
question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him." This
language is sweeping in tenor, and the legislative history makes it
clear that Article 31 (a) was intended to prohibit compulsion in all
types of official investigations or proceedings, judicial or extrajudicial.14 Thus the Code's privilege against self-incrimination would
be violated if a military superior investigating an offense obtained a
confession from one of his subordinates by ordering the latter to
answer all questions regarding that offense. 15 It would also be
violated if a military policeman used threats or physical violence to
obtain a confession. The first of these examples has no exact parallel
10. 41 STAT. 792 (1920), as amended, 62 STAT. 631 (1948).

11. See

MANUAL

COURTS-MARTIAL,

U.S. Army, 1928,

FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
U. S. Army, 1949,
35a.

35a;

MANUAL FOR

Hereinafter cited respectively as

MCM 1928, and MCM 1949.

12. See

DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY,

1912-1940, § 381.
13. See CM 337189, Harris (JC)%, 7 BR-JC 393, 414-19 (1949).

14. Both the Senate and the House Committees on Armed Services stated
that Article 31 (a) was intended to extend the privilege "to all persons under
all circumstances." See SEN. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1949)
(hereinafter cited as SEN. REP.); H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1949) (hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.). It may be noted that Professor
Edmund M. Morgan, who played a leading part in drafting the Uniform Code,
has expressed the view that the privilege should be extended by civilian
courts to police interrogations. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,34 MImm. L. REV. 1, 27-30 (1949).

15. United States v. Rosato, 3 USCMA 143, 11 CMR 143 (1953); United
States v. Welch, 1 USCMA 402, 3 CMR 136 (1952).
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in the civilian world; the conduct in the second example, however,
would normally be viewed as giving rise to an involuntary confession
rather than to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RuLE IN ARTICLE 31 (d)

Although the privilege against self-incrimination contained in
Article 31(a) is not limited to statements made during judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, it does not purport to cover the whole
field of conduct which will render a confession involuntary. Furthermore, it does not in terms require the exclusion from evidence of
statements obtained in violation of the privilege. To cover those
omissions, Article 31 (d) provides:
"No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article
[31], or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful
inducement shall be received in evidence against him in a trial by
court-martial."
It will be observed that Article 31(d) is focused directly on the
court-martial proceedings. It is thus distinguished from the first three
Subsections of Article 31 which are phrased in the form of a command
addressed to persons subject to the Code. The "command" phraseology was evidently adopted for two reasons. 17 First, it was considered advisable to legislate within the jurisdictional framework of
the Code. A provision not limited to persons subject to the Code
might well have raised delicate constitutional questions. Second,
the "command" Subsections are directly related to Article 98 of the
Code which makes it an offense to knowingly and intentionally fail
"to enforce or comply with any provision of this code regulating the
proceedings before ... trial of an accused." Accordingly, a violation

of those Subsections may subject the offender to the penal sanctions
in Article 98.
It is interesting to note that, as first introduced in Congress and
subsequently passed by the House, Article 31 (d) excluded only statements obtained in violation of Article 31 or by any "unlawful inducement."'Is The meaning of "unlawful inducement" was not clarified
during the House or Senate hearings, although it was presumably
used in a broad sense to refer to any type of coercion or promise of
leniency which would render a confession involuntary under the
16. See Morgan, supra note 14, at 27-30; Note, The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination:Does It Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REv. 459 (1953).
17. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at 991-92; H.R. REP., supra note 14,
at 19.
18. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at 983; Hearings before a Subcommittee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1949) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings); 95 CONG. REC. 5733, 5744
(1949).
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common-law rules of evidence.' 9 During the Senate hearings, however, the Judge Advocate General of the Army recommended that
Article 31 (d) be amended to hclude "coercion" as well.2 ° He argued
that since certain types of inducements might not be unlawful under
the laws of the state or foreign country where the confession was obtained, the original version of Article 31(d) might not operate to
exclude statements obtained under such circumstances. The Senate
Committee on Armed Services ultimately amended Article 31 (d) to
include "coercion" but contented itself with the somewhat cryptic
observation that its amendment specifically incorporated the commonlaw rule of evidence. 2'
The 1951 Manual sets forth various rules which interpret the terms
used in Article 31 (d). The Manual does not purport to establish
inflexible criteria for determining voluntariness, although it notes
that the mere fact that the statement was made to an investigator
during the investigation of an offense, or while the accused was in
custody, does not make the confession involuntary. 22 In cases involving a claim of coercion or unlawful inducement, the Court of Military
Appeals has examined all the circumstances in relation to the crucial
question of the accused's mental freedom to confess or deny.P Its
holdings are in line with the rules generally recognized in American
civilian jurisdictions.
THE WAMNG REQUImMNT

nq ARTIcLE 31 (b)

Thus far, it has been indicated that the military law of confessions
is similar to the rules applied in most civilian courts. Article 31 (b),
however, marks a radical departure from those rules and has created
a number of perplexing legal problems. It provides as follows:
"No person subject to this code shall interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising
19. This was Wigmore's usage in his treatise. See 3 WIGMORE, EviDENcE §
824 (3d ed. 1940).

20. See Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 268.
21. See SEN. REP., supra note 14, at 16. It seems likely that the recommendation of The Judge Advocate General was particularly directed toward the
French inquisitorial system of interrogation by the juge d'instruction. In
this connection, see Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy
for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1244-47 (1932); Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France, 88 U. of PA. L. REV. 692, 705-12
(1940); Tyndale, The Organization and Administration of Justice in France,
13 CAN. B. REv. 655, 662-64 (1935).
22. MCM 1951, f 140a; United States v. Vigneault, 3 USCMA 247, 12 CMR 3
(1953); United States v. Colbert, 2 USCMA 3, 6 CMR 3 (1952).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 3 USCMA 646, 14 CMR 64 (1954);
United States v. Colbert, supra note 22. In line with this approach, the court
has held that a prior involuntary confession does not necessarily invalidate
a subsequent voluntary confession. United States v. Monge, 1 USCMA 95, 2
CAR 1 (1952); United States v. Sapp, 1 USCMA 100, 2 CMR 6 (1952). This
accords with the federal rule. E.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
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him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the
offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement
made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by
court-martial."

Under the exclusionary rule in Article 31 (d), a statement obtained in
violation of this warning requirement cannot be received in evidence
against the accused in a trial by court-martial.
The warning requirement is not new in military law. On the contrary, the armed services have long emphasized the desirability of

warning a suspect of his rights prior to conducting an interrogation.
The 1928 Army Manual for Courts-Martial provided that in the
ordinary case the court-martial should make further inquiry into the
circumstances of a confession made to a military superior.24 Moreover, Army boards of review put teeth into this provision by holding
that such a confession was not admissible in evidence if the accused
had not previously been advised of his right against self-incrimination.25 In the Navy the rule was somewhat less strict. Although a
warning was not a prerequisite to admissibility, 2 comparatively
minor inducements offered by a military superior were held to invali27
date a confession.
In 1948, the so-called Elston Act 28 revised the Articles of War

which, with a few isolated amendments, had been continuously in
effect since 1920. Among other things, Article of War 24 was enlarged
by adding a warning requirement similar to that in Article 31 (b) of
the Code.- The amendment to Article of War 24 did more than
merely incorporate in statutory form the rules adopted by Army
24. MCM 1928, 114a. The 1928 Army Manual was a condensed version of,
and did not purport to supersede entirely, the 1921 Manual which expressly
stated that it was the duty of an officer conducting an investigation to warn
the person being interrogated of his right against self-incrimination and
that statements obtained without such a warning "should" be excluded from
evidence. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1921, [1122j, 225b. See
also WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 329 (2d ed. 1920 Reprint).
25. There are many cases so holding. E.g., CM 331841, Martinez, 80
BR 171, 179-80 (1948); CM 324725, Blakeley, 73 BR 307, 319-20 (1947); CM

318851, Stacy, 68 BR 53, 56-58 (1947).
26. See NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1937, § 181. This publication was the

Navy counterpart of the Army Manual for Courts-Martial and implemented
the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
27. E.g., COURT-MARTIAL ORDER No. 2-1944, p. 266 (superior's advice to
tell the truth renders confession involuntary); COURT-MARTIAL ORDER No.
2-1943, p. 66 (superior's advice that accused's statement "would be taken
into consideration by his senior officers" renders confession involuntary).
Cf. INBAU AND REI, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 216-19 (3d
ed. 1953).
28. 62 STAT. 627 (1948).
29. The amendment to Article of War 24 was offered on the floor of the

House by Representative Burleson of Texas who erroneously stated that a
warning was required in most states. See 94 CONG. REC. 184-85 (1948); cf.
notes 32 and 33, infra. Another member of the House objected on the ground
that the Army already required a warning, but after a very brief debate the
amendment was agreed to.
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boards of review. As construed in the 1949 Army Manual, it had the
important effect of shifting the crucial factor from superior military
rank to the element of "officiality" in pretrial investigations." Thus
a sergeant assigned to interrogate a captain suspected of an offense
was required to give the statutory warning, and lacking such a warning, the captain's confession obtained during the interrogation could
not be received in evidence. Under the former Army rule a confession
obtained under such circumstances would normally have been considered entirely voluntary and therefore admissible before a courtmartial. 31
Functions of the warning requirement. Texas is the only American
jurisdiction which has a statutory warning requirement similar to
Article 31 (b). However, the Texas statute contains certain exceptions
to its warning requirement, as where the authorities discover a
weapon used in the commission of the crime as a result of information
obtained from the accused's confession. 32 In the absence of statute,
American courts have uniformly held that a failure to warn the
suspect of his rights during a police interrogation will not, standing
alone, require the exclusion of his confession.33 Although not always
articulated in the opinions, these holdings find theoretical support in
the concept of trustworthiness advanced by Mr. Wigmore as the
true basis for excluding involuntary confessions as incompetent. 84
While a failure to warn might conceivably induce a confession from
a guilty man who is laboring under a vast misconception of his duty
to cooperate fully in police interrogations, it will be rare indeed that
an innocent person will confess to a crime solely because he was not
advised of his right against self-incrimination.3 5 Unlike physical
30. See MCM 1949, 'i
CMR 164, 170 (1954).

127a; United States v. Gibson, 3 USCMA 746, 752, 14

31. CM 333420, Hummel, 81 BR 349, 358 (1948); CM 320445, Gaillard, 69
BR 345, 373-76 (1947); CM 282913, Atkinson, 55 BR 21, 27 (1945).

32. TEx. CoM. CMv. PROc. ANN. art. 727 (Vernon, 1941). The peculiarities
of the Texas statute are discussed in McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 239, 252-54
(1946).
33. State cases are collected in INBAU AND REID, op-. cit. supra note 27, 224 n.
217. The Supreme Court has stated- that the failure on the part of the police to
advise the suspect of his rights bears upon voluntariness. See Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949),; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-1 (1947). However, the
courts of appeal have expressly held that a failure to warn will not bar the admission of confessions in the federal courts. E.g., United States v. Heitner, 149
F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cryne v. United States, 326 U.S.
727 (1945)1; Gerard v. United States, 61 F.2d 872, 874 (7th Cir. 1932).
34. See 3 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 822. This theory has been questioned by a leading authority in the field of evidence, who argued that the
confession rule is primarily designed to protect the individual's privilege
against self-incrimination. See McCormick, supra note 32, at 239-45; McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TExAs L. REV. 447,
451-57 (1938).
35. Cf. Note, Voluntary False Confessions: A Neglected Area in Criminal
Administration,28 IND. L.J. 374, 383 (1953).
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abuse, which gives rise to the unpleasant alternatives of confessing
guilt or absorbing more punishment, the relatively neutral circumstance of a failure to warn does not create any real inducement to
confess falsely. Moreover, it may be noted that in the military there
is an affirmative factor tending to guarantee trustworthiness. Under
Article 107 of the Code it is a serious offense to make a false official
statement, and a false denial of guilt during an official investigation
is punishable regardless of whether the accused had been warned of
his rights in accordance with Article 31 (b).36 Of course, this does not
suggest that untrustworthy confessions cannot be obtained from a
military suspect by means other than physical coercion, unlawful
inducements, and the like. Fear of the authority exercised by a
military superior may, in the unusual case, cause a frightened and
inexperienced enlisted man to agree to virtually any incriminating
statement. But as a general proposition, the warning requirement
cannot be satisfactorily rationalized in terms of the concept of trustworthiness. Its thrust is in quite different directions.
The most common justification for Article 31 (b) is found in the
inherent characteristics of the military service. Prompt and unflinching obedience to the orders of a superior is the cornerstone of military
discipline. And as frequently as not, statements phrased in the form
of a request are interpreted as orders t Accordingly, in the typical
situation involving the interrogation of an enlisted man by his commanding officer, there is a considerable degree of coercive influence
exerted by superior military rank alone. In such a case, ordinary
considerations of self-protection may vanish in the face of what the
enlisted man may well believe to be his duty to answer all questions,
or suffer the serious consequences flowing from disobedience of orders
given by his superior officer.38 Moreover, there is no blinking the
plain fact that interrogations conducted by law enforcement officers
are, by the very nature of things, characterized by a certain degree of
pressure. The suspect suddenly finds himself apprehended, placed in
confinement, and questioned by persons intent upon ascertaining his
connection with the offense. Under such conditions the warning requirement operates to serve notice upon the suspect that his interro36. MCM 1951, f 140a; CM 365800, Hudson, 12 CMR 276 (1953).
37. It is to be noted that a failure to obey a "request" may, under certain
circumstances, constitute an offense punishable under the Code as a failure
to obey a lawful order. United States v. Glaze, 3 USCMA 168, 11 CMR 168
(1953).
38. A comparison of the maximum punishments is revealing. In wartime,
the willful disobedience of the lawful order of a superior officer carries a
maximum punishment of death, UCMJ art. 90, 50 U.S.C.A. § 684 (1951),
although it is presently limited to a maximum of five years' confinement at
hard labor, except in the Far East Command. MCM 1951, 1 127c, as modified by Exec. Order No. 10247, 16 FED. REG. 5035 (May, 1951). A wrongful
refusal to testify before a court-martial carries a maximum punishment of
five years' confinement at hard labor. MCM 1951, 127c.
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gators are cognizant of his right to remain silent-that they know
that they cannot lawfully compel him to speak. Thus Article 31 (b),
by forcing the interrogators to adopt a somewhat more impartial
attitude, not only mitigates the coercion peculiarly associated with
the military, but also tends to assure that the accused's confession wll
be the product of complete mental freedom.
Often overlooked, however, is another important justification for
the warning requirement. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as well as most state criminal codes, require prompt arraignment of a
person placed under arrest. Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules provides
that such a person must be taken before a United States commissioner
"without unnecessary delay," and Rule 5 (b) requires the commissioner to inform the individual of his right to counsel and of his right
to remain silent. This type of preliminary proceeding is unknown in
military law where the primary emphasis is upon speed in bringing
charges to trial or dismissing them. Although the Code contains certain monitory provisions which tend to accelerate the period between
apprehension and trial,39 the 1951 Manual expressly provides that a
delay in preferring charges does not operate to release an accused
from confinement.40 The Code itself appears to contemplate that a
period of eight days may properly elapse between the accused's confinement and the forwarding of the formal charges to the authority
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction. 41 Furthermore, the
accused does not have any right to counsel until charges have been
formally preferred against him.42 As a practical matter, of course,

this right may be most important to an accused at the time of the first
police interrogation, for even the best trial attorney43 may be able to do
little for the soldier who has made a full confession.
Under this statutory framework, there is a hiatus between the
accused's apprehension and the forwarding of formal charges, during
39. Article 10 of the Code provides in part: "When any person subject to this
code is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be
taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which h. is accused and to try
him or to dismiss the charges and release him." A similar provision is found
in Article 30(b). Also, Article 33 provides: ". . . the commanding officer
shall, within eight days after the accused is ordered into arrest or confinement, if practicable, forward the charges ... to the officer exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction."
40. Paragraph 22 provides: "Although charges should be preferred promptly
the accused is not automatically released from restraint because of any
delay in preferring the charges. He must remain in arrest or confinement
until released by proper authority."
41. See UCMJ art. 33, supra note 39.
42. United States v. Moore, 4 USCMA 482, 16 CMR 56 (1954); CM 359571,
Shaull, 10 CMR 241, pet. for rev. denied, 11 CMR 248 (1953); ACM 4903,
Nicholson, 4 CMR 519 (1952).
43. The late Mr. Justice Jackson ably stated the conflicting policy considerations in his separate opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949), where
he forthrightly observed that granting the right to counsel immediately 1.pon
being taken into custody would seriously cripple the effectiveness of current
methods of criminal investigation.
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which he is at the mercy of the military law enforcement authorities.
It does not appear that these authorities have abused the right to
conduct interrogations while the accused is confined in a stockade or
similar prison facility. 44 Nevertheless, the warning requirement is a
substantial deterrent to untrammeled police interrogation methods.
Article 31 (b) must therefore serve in lieu of the right to counsel and
of arraignment proceedings of the type contemplated by the Federal
Rules. Strict compliance with its mandate would seem essential if the
military is to achieve some reasonable balance between the need for
prompt crime detection and the rights of the individual.
Administrative and judicial interpretation of Article 31 (b). The
broad, inclusive language of Article 31 (b) was presumably chosen
in order to avoid serious loopholes which might subsequently require
corrective legislation. Literally interpreted, however, it would cover
some situations which are not within its apparent functions. And
since the exclusionary rule in Article 31 (d) is tied directly to the
scope of Article 31 (b), there are apparently no circumstances which
would, in a particular case, excuse a failure to warn and thus permit
an otherwise voluntary confession to be received in evidence. On the
other hand, it is only persons subject to the Code who must give the
prescribed warning. Civilian investigators employed by the military
departments are not covered by Article 31 (b).
Limitation to official investigations:
Article of War 24 required a warning to be given to an "accused or
person being investigated.."45 In the 1949 Manual, this phrase was
construed as limiting the warning requirement to official investigations. Although Article 31 (b) of the Code refers only to persons
"accused or suspected of an offense," the use of terms such as "interrogate," "request a statement," and "nature of the accusation" suggest
strongly that Article 31 (b), like its immediate predecessor, extends
44. Well-trained criminal investigators do not need to rely upon coercion
to obtain confessions, and the problem in the military becomes acute primarily under conditions of all-out war when numerous investigators must be
hurriedly recruited. Since the enactment of the Code, only a few instances
of prolonged interrogation appear in the reports. See United States v. Fair,
2 USCMA 521, 10 CMR 19 (1953)' (repeated questioning for more than seven

days while accused was in segregation cell, but accused was advised of his
rights at least five times); ACM 5753, McElroy, 8 CMR 615, pet. for rev.
denied, 9 CMR 139 (1953) (repeated and prolonged questioning for several
days while accused was held in "solitary," but accused was frequently advised of his rights).
45. The warning requirement in Article of War 24 was not artfully drafted.
It provided in pertinent part: "It shall be the duty of any person in obtaining
any statement from an accused to advise him [of his right to remain silent)
regarding the offense of which he is accused or being investigated. .... "
(Emphasis added.) In the Army, a person is technically not an "accused"
until formal charges against him have been prepared. However, the words
"or being investigated" made it apparent that the warning was necessary
at some point prior to the formal accusation and this was the view taken
by the Army. MCM 1949, ff 127a; CM 335000, Cellner (BR), 2 BR-JC 1 (1949).
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only to official investigations. In any event, the 1951 Manual for
Courts-Martialadopts this interpretation.
A close reading of paragraph 140a of the 1951 Manual reveals that
it rationalizes Article 31(b) in terms of the factor of "implied coercion" which may characterize an official investigation. In the Manual,
the word "voluntary" is used as a term of art. Thus, the Manual
provides that "To be admissible, a confession or admission ... must

be voluntary," and that "A confession which was obtained through the
use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement is not
voluntary." It then sets forth "some instances of coercion, unlawful
influence, and unlawful inducement," among which are the following:
"Infliction of bodily harm ....
"Threats of bodily harm ....
"During an official investigation (formal or informal) in which the
accused is a person accused or suspected of the offense, obtaining the
statement by interrogation or request without giving a preliminary
warning of the right against self-incrimination--except when the
accused was aware of that right and the statement was not obtained
in violation of Article 31b.
"Obtaining the statement in violation of Article 31."
In effect, the Manual takes the position that, once the element of

officiality is established, there is a conclusive presumption of coercion
and hence, involuntariness, if the accused's statement was not preceded by an Article 31 (b) warning. Elsewhere in the Manual, the
term "involuntary" is used without any attempt to distinguish between
the several types of conduct which may constitute coercion. Accordingly, in terms of their evidentiary consequences, a failure to warn
and a brutal beating are treated identically.
At first, the Court of Military Appeals appeared unwilling to accept
the Manual's thesis that Article 31 (b) applies only to official investigations. In United States v. Wilson and Harvey,46 the accused, two
privates, were convicted of the premeditated murder of a Korean
national. Immediately after the fatal shooting, one Sergeant Wang,
a military policeman, had been summoned to the scene. There, another MP told Sergeant Wang that some Koreans had identified the
accused as the offenders from a number of soldiers who were gathered
about. Looking directly at the two accused, Sergeant Wang asked
who had done the shooting and the accused replied that they had
"shot at" the Korean. Although Sergeant Wang did not preface his
question with the required warning, the replies of the accused were
admitted in evidence at their court-martial.
These facts would seem to make it clear that Sergeant Wang was
46. 2 USCMA 248, 8 CMR 48 (1953).
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conducting an informal official investigation, with the result that
the incriminating statements made by the accused would not have
been admissible under the Manual's interpretation of Article 31(b).

The majority of the court reached the same result, but solely upon a
literal reading of Article 31(b). After stating that no question was
raised as to the "voluntary" nature of the statements, 47 the court
reasoned as follows:
"[The provisions of Article 31 (b) and (d)] are as plain and unequivocal as legislation can be. According to the Uniform Code ...,
Sergeant Wang was a 'person subject to this code,' and appellants,
at the time the question was directed to them, were persons 'suspected
of an offense.' Consequently, the statements should have been excluded in accordance
with Article 31(d) and their admission was
48
clearly erroneous.1
Apparently the court considered that the element of officiality was
relevant only in determining whether a rehearing was automatically
49
required.
The purely mechanical view adopted in Wilson and Harvey returned to haunt the court in United States v. Gibson,5 0 which involved
the use of an informer by the Army Criminal Investigation Division.
The accused, Gibson, had been apprehended and confined in a post
stockade on suspicion of having committed several offenses of housebreaking and larceny. The CID instructed a provost sergeant to put
a "good reliable rat" in close proximity to the accused. Another
private in the stockade was selected and in due course the accused
confided to him that he, the accused, had committed the offenses. At
the accused's trial, the informer's testimony was admitted in evidence.
In this case it was fairly clear that the informer had "interrogated"
the accused, and it was undisputed that the informer was a person subject to the Code and that the interrogation had not been preceded by
an Article 31 (b) warning. Accordingly, all the conditions announced
by the majority in Wilson and Harvey were present. However, after
reviewing the history of the warning requirement in military law, the
same majority concluded that the accused's confession was outside
the scope of Article 31 (b), relying upon the absence of any officiality
with its attendant implied coercion.
At this point, mention should be made of the interpretation of
47. 2 USCMA at 254, 8 CMR at 54. A similar observation appears in United
States v. Williams, 2 USCMA 430, 433, 9 CMR 60, 63 (1953), where the court
stated that in confession cases two inquiries were necessary: first, whether the
confession was voluntary, and second, whether the accused had been warned of
his rights. The effect of this rationale was to divorce the warning requirement from its apparent functional basis.
48. 2 USCMA at 255, 8 CMR at 55.
49. See p. 47, infra.
50. 3 USCMA 746,14 CMR 164 (1954).
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Article 31 (b) advanced by Judge Latimer in his separate opinions in
the Wilson and Harvey and Gibson cases.51 This interpretation assumes particular significance since the military departments have
52
used it as a guide in recommending an amendment to Article 31 (b)
on the ground that "the wide coverage of the present article has
resulted in unnecessary difficulties in the path of effective crime
' 53
detection and punishment.
In Wilson and Harvey, Judge Latimer argued that an Article
31 (b) warning should be required only if three specified factors are
present. These are: (1) that the interrogator occupies an official
position in connection with law enforcement or crime detection; (2)
that the interrogation is in furtherance of an official investigation;
and (3) that the facts have been developed to a point where the interrogator has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person interrogated has committed an offense. 54 It will be noted that the second
factor is in line with the theory of implied coercion adopted by the
1951 Manual and ultimately by the majority of the court in Gibson.
However, by importing objective criteria into Article 31 (b), the other
two factors appear not only to lose sight of one of its fundamental
purposes-the protection of the military suspect from implied coercion-but also to inhibit legitimate investigative techniques.
The first factor would require that the interrogator occupy an
"official position." As construed by Judge Latimer in the Gibson
case, the fact of an official position would alone determine the need
for a warning. Hence it would be immaterial that the suspect did not
know of the interrogator's status and indeed thought him to be a
friend. The official position factor would thus have the effect of
preventing full use of information obtained from the suspect during
undercover investigations by military personnel. It is, moreover, at
war with the theory of implied coercion, for if the suspect is wholly
unaware of the interrogator's official position, such coercion is
obviously lacking. Where, as in Gibson, the interrogator is a mere
informer whose services have been solicited by military law enforcement authorities, Judge Latimer would apparently have the applicability of Article 31 (b) depend upon whether the informer was their
"agent." This agency relationship would be in part determined by
51. See United States v. Wilson and Harvey, 2 USCMA 248, 257, 8 CMR 48,
57 (1953) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Gibson, 3 USCMA 746, 757,
14 CMR 164, 175 (1954) (concurring opinion).

52. See 2 ANN. REP. OF THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, THE JUDGE ADvoCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 33 (1953). Legislation implementing this and other

recommendations had been drafted but had not been cleared through the
Bureau of the Budget when the Eighty-Third Congress adjourned in August,
1954.
53. See ARMY, NAVY, AIm FORCE JOURNAL, June 12, 1954, p. 1253, col. 3
54. 2 USCMA at 261, 8 CMR at 61.
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the extent of the informer's cooperation with the authorities and his
knowledge of the details concerning the offense which he was asked
to investigate. Such indicia would seem to put a premium upon a
haphazard, hit-or-miss investigative procedure, and their relevance to
the implied coercion which may be exerted by the informer is not
apparent. Of course, it may, as a matter of policy, be desirable to prohibit the use of undercover agents and informers. 55 But putting that
consideration aside, it seems clear that this proposed limitation of
Article 31 (b) is not well calculated to achieve the stated purpose of
removing obstacles to crime detection and punishment.
Apparently the further limitation to officials engaged in "law enforcement or crime detection" will not be followed in the proposed
amendment to Article 31(b). Many official investigations are conducted by military personnel who have no official position in connection with law enforcement or crime detection activities. These investigations are carried on for purposes largely unrelated to future
court-martial action, although the evidence discovered may show
the conunission of an offense under the Code. In the Army, for
example, "line-of-duty" investigations must be conducted to determine whether a soldier's injuries were in line of duty and not due
to his own misconduct. The results affect his pay and length of
service, yet the facts disclosed may indicate malingering. Similarly,
investigations of automobile accidents involving Army personnel
are conducted to determine the extent of the Government's liability
in the event that a claim is thereafter made against it. The facts
may also show that the soldier responsible for the accident was
driving recklessly or while drunk. In such investigations the elimination of the Article 31 (b) warning would amount to setting a trap for
the unwary soldier who may quite reasonably believe that his statements will be used for a purpose other than as evidence in a trial by
57
court-martial.
55. In the federal courts, evidence obtained by undercover agents or informers is generally admissible unless their conduct amounts to entrapment.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See Donnelly, Judicial Control
of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J.
1091 (1951). In one military case, a lieutenant who had been working closely
with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations testified at length concerning the statements made by a sergeant charged with attempting to sell military
secrets to the enemy. The sergeant had thought the lieutenant to be a fellow
conspirator. Fortunately, this case arose after Gibson and the Air Force
board of review was able to affirm the findings of guilty on the basis of the
rationale of implied coercion adopted by the majority of the court. ACM
8212, Cascio, -CMR(1954).
56. For an instance where this occurred, see United States v. Pedersen, 2
USCMA 263, 8 CMR 63 (1953).
57. In CM 230377, Wilson, 17 BR 361, 366 (1943), involving misleading
advice given a suspected enlisted man by his superior officer, the Army board
of review made the following pertinent observation: "[Ilt is not only the
purpose of military justice to safeguard the soldier and the court from the
consequences of a false confession, but ... it is also its purpose to protect the

19541

MILITARY LAW OF CONFESSIONS

There remains for consideration the third limiting factor developed
in Wilson and Harvey: that the interrogator have "reasonable
grounds" to suspect the person interrogated. It will be recalled that at
the time Sergeant Wang asked the accused who had done the shooting, he knew only that a Korean had been killed, that he had been
summoned to the scene, and that hearsay had identified the accused
as the perpetrators. According to Judge Latimer, this meant that "no
one, except possibly the eyewitnesses, knew whether a crime had
been committed" and therefore that the accused were not then suspected of an offense. But this view of the facts seems somewhat
precious, for the very occurrence of a homicide would, under the
circumstances of that case, probably have aroused stern suspicions
in the mind of a military policeman stationed in Korea. Moreover,
the replies made by the accused, to the effect that they had "shot at"
the Korean, would not necessarily indicate the commission of a
crime since the shooting might have been justifiable or excusable.
Their replies did no more than confirm the hearsay evidence previously communicated to Sergeant Wang, who presumably could
have continued to interrogate the accused consistently with Article
31 (b). Thus the theory advocated by Judge Latimer would encourage
unrestricted interrogation of a suspect in lieu of making an attempt
to determine from other witnesses whether a crime had been committed. Carried to its logical conclusion, this theory would require
a warning only after the accused's replies had eliminated any possibility of innocence. 58
The reasonable grounds requirement also seems objectionable on
the ground that it would remove the need for an Article 31 (b)
warning where the interrogator, knowing that an offense has been
committed, has no substantial evidence tending to identify the person interrogated as the offender. 9 Let us assume that a wallet has
soldier from the consequences of his own ignorance, and to assure him that
trust and confidence reposed in the statements or promises of superior officers
is well placed."
58. Judge Latimer did not elaborate on this matter, although he did observe
that until "the elements of the crime start to take form, it would be unlikely
for one asking preliminary questions to know the nature of the accusations."
United States v. Wilson and Harvey, 2 USCMA 248, 261, 8 CMR 48, 61 (1953).
However, this would hardly seem an insuperable objection, for the court has
since held that a failure to inform the suspect of the nature of the accusation
will invalidate a confession "in only the rare and unusual case." United
States v. O'Brien, 3 USCMA 105, 11 CMR 105 (1953). Moreover, it is important to note that a failure to warn the suspect during the "preliminary" inquiry does not foreclose the use of subsequent statements obtained after complying with Article 31 (b). See note 23, supra.
59. During the House hearings it was agreed that Article 31(b) would
extend to this situation. See House Hearings,supra note 8, at 990-91. Moreover, it was expressly stated that the inclusion of the term "suspected" would
have the effect of broadening the protection afforded by Article of War 24.
See SEN. REP., supra note 14, at 16; H.R. REP., supra note 14, at 19. Cf. note

45 supra.
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been stolen from Corporal Brown's footlocker located in an Army
barracks. Brown's company commander, Captain Jones, calls in five
privates with cots near that of the victim. As each private enters
his office, Captain Jones says to him, "I want you to tell me the truth.
Did you steal Brown's wallet?" Private Smith, thinking that he must
"talk," confesses to the offense. The emasculation of the right to
remain silent is apparent in this sort of interrogation. Yet the proposed reasonable grounds limitation would authorize unrestricted
interrogation under these circumstances, so long as it did not involve
actual coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.
This hypothetical case points up one curious aspect of the proposed
limitation of Article 31(b). The ordinary meaning of the word
"suspect" 60 seems basically incompatible with the reasonable grounds
requirement. A suspicion may be, and often is, grounded on little
more than a hunch which will fall far short of constituting reasonable grounds. Captain Jones would not have interrogated the privates
as he did, if he had not "suspected" them. But their proximity to
the victim's footlocker would clearly not be reasonable grounds for
believing that one or more of them had taken the wallet. Thus the
apparent effect of the reasonable grounds requirement is to relegate
an Article 31 (b) warning to some later stage of the investigation
where the authorities have discovered incriminating facts which
would almost be sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
suspect.
The limitations found in the recommended amendment to Article
31 (b) reflect an effort to mitigate the impact of a rule which often
operates in favor of the guilty. Unfortunately, the nature of those
limitations would seemingly result in arbitrary distinctions having
little or no relationship to the functions of Article 31 (b). Implied
coercion is a fact of military life, and it is submitted that, wherever
such coercion may go, Article 31 (b) should follow.
May a failure to warn be excused?:
The warning requirement was presumably incorporated in the
Code with an eye toward the interrogation of an enlisted man by
a military superior or his representative. All cases do not, however,
fit neatly into this pattern. In fact, the warning may at times be
merely perfunctory. To take an admittedly exaggerated example,
let us suppose that a major in the Judge Advocate General's Corps
is suspected of having committed an offense under the Code. A CID
sergeant is assigned to interrogate the major concerning this offense;
however, perhaps overawed by superior rank, the sergeant uninten60. For example, WEBsTEs'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1952)
defines the verb "suspect" as, "To imagine (one) to be guilty ... on slight
evidence, or without proof.....
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tionally fails to warn the major. During the course of the routine
interrogation, the major admits various incriminating facts. Here,
the sergeant's ability to exert coercive influences will ordinarily be
negligible, and it may be assumed that the major, a military lawyer,
is thoroughly conversant with the provisions of Article 31(b). Accordingly, it seems obvious that a warning by the sergeant would
have added little, if anything, to the voluntariness of the major's
admissions. Hence the theory of implied coercion does not supply
a satisfactory functional explanation for the warning requirement.
The 1948 amendment to Article of War 24 did not provide that a
statement obtained in violation of its warning requirement must
be excluded from evidence. This omission permitted some latitude
for administrative interpretation, and the 1949 Manual provided
that the accused's confession could be admitted in evidence despite
a failure, to warn, if it was shown that he had been aware of his
rights at the time."' However, the flat exclusionary rule in Article
31 (d) of the Code is not susceptible of such an administrative gloss.
Accordingly, the 1951 Manual takes the position that facts tending to
show an absence of implied coercion are immaterial, and in our
hypothetical case the major's admission must be excluded at his
62
subsequent trial by court-martial.
Service boards of review have followed the Manual's view that
the accused's prior knowledge of his ,rights will not excuse a failure
to warn. 63 The Court of Military Appeals has not yet been confronted
with a case where the circumstances surrounding the accused's confession showed beyond question that the failure to give the required
warning did not affect its voluntariness. However, in the Gibson
case, involving the Government's use of an informer, the court's
opinion emphasized the coercive influence of superior rank or official
position upon persons being interrogated. The court then observed
that:
"[I]t is our duty to see to it that such rights are not extended beyond
the reasonable intendment of the Code at the expense of substantial
justice and on grounds that are fanciful or unsubstantial."6 4
61. MCM 1949, 11127a.

62. MCM 1951, 1 140a. This is made perfectly clear in LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, which was

prepared by the draftsmen of the 1951 Manual primarily in order to explain

its many new provisions to military lawyers. The LEGAL

AND

LEGISLATIVE BASIS

states flatly that it is not material that the person interrogated "may have been
well aware of his right not to incriminate himself (an, accused lawyer, or [sic]
example) ." Id. at 216. See also Sellingsloh and Hodson, Civilian Counsel in
General Court-Martial Cases Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
[1952] WASH. U.L.Q. 356, 370. Colonel Hodson was among those who played a

leading part in the drafting of the 1951 Manual.
63. ACM 7072, Hawk, 12 CMR 741 (1953); CM 364267, Orange, 11 CMR 411
(1953).

64. United States v. Gibson, 3 USCMA 746, 752, 14 CMR 164, 170 (1954).
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Although this assertion suggests that the court may be willing to
adopt "implied coercion" as the controlling criterion in every case,
it would seem that Gibson reflects in part a belated move to cure the
unnecessarily broad holding in Wilson and Harvey. Moreover, the
court was able to point to ample precedent in support of its limitation
of Article 31 (b) to official investigations. In view of the rule announced in the 1951 Manual,it seems doubtful whether the court will,
in the name of implied coercion, make further inroads upon the scope
of Article 31 (b).
It may be noted that an interesting and persuasive analogy can be
drawn between the exclusionary rule in Article 31 (d) and the federal
McNabb rule.65 Under the McNabb rule a confession obtained in
violation of the prompt arraignment requirements of Rule 5 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure6 6 cannot be admitted in evidence
in the federal district court. McNabb represents a judicial attempt to
control police investigative techniques and, by denying to the Government the fruits of such a confession, tends to effectuate the rights
guaranteed by Rule 5. Although the McNabb rule has not been
applied in an entirely mechanical manner, 7 it clearly does not depend upon the particular accused's resistance to the psychological
pressures exerted by "secret interrogation" or "unlawful detention."08
The Code does not provide for proceedings comparable to those
required by Rule 5, and the McNabb rule itself has been held inapplicable to military law.69 But as indicated earlier, the protective
functions of Article 31 (b) and Rule 5 are substantially the same.
Accordingly, it is arguable that Article 31 (d) announces a military
McNabb rule which is designed to provide a further assurance that
military personnel will comply with the warning requirement of
Article 31 (b). This analogy would seem to accord with the spirit of
Article 36 (a) of the Code which makes it transparently clear that,
to the extent practicable, the rules of evidence applied in the federal
courts are to govern courts-martial.
65. See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United

States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

66. See p. 27, supra.
67. Where the delay in arraigning the suspect was not "unreasonable," the
courts of appeal have held the McNabb rule inapplicable. E.g., Allen v.
United, States, 202 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 869 (1952);
Mora v. United States, 190 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1951). However, the reasonableness of the delay depends upon the availability of the United States Commissioner and similar factors which are extraneous to the quantum of psychological coercion which may have been exerted upon the suspect.
68. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948). See also Wicker,
Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5 VAND. L. REV. 507,
512-15 (1952).
69. United States v. Moore, 4 USCMA 482, 16 CMR 56 (1954). The same
result was reached under the Articles of War. CM 328248, Richardson, 77 BR
1, 22-23 (1948). See also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 145 n. 12 (1953);
Richardson v. Zuppann, 81 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949), aff'd per curiam,
174 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1949).
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Persons not subject to the Code:
The warning required by Article 31 (b) need be given only by persons subject to the Code. This gap in the otherwise inclusive coverage
of Article 31 (b) presented a serious problem to the draftsmen of the
1951 Manual, for there are a number of civilian investigators employed
within the military establishment O Although not subject to the
Code, these civilians are representatives of the military commander,
with the result that there may be a substantial element of implied
coercion in their interrogations. In addition, state and local police
officials, as well as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may
have occasion to deal with military personnel who are accused or
1
suspected of an offense.

We have seen that the Manual excludes a statement obtained from
the accused during "an official investigation" if the accused was not
aware of his right against self-incrimination or if the statement was
obtained in violation of Article 31 (b) .72 Although somewhat awkwardly phrased, this provision was clearly designed to extend the
exclusionary rule to any official investigation conducted by a person
not subject to the Code 75 There is considerable justification for this
70. The Navy employs civilian investigators at its shore installations. See
Ward UCMJ-Does It Work?, 6 VAND. L. REv. 186, 196-97 (1953).
71. In addition to handling offenses committed by servicemen off military
reservations, civilian police officials are specifically authorized to apprehend
deserters from the armed forces. UCMJ art. 8, 50 U.S.C.A. § 562 (1951).
72. See p. 29, supra. It will be noted that the right against self-incrimination is not so broad as the right to remain silent conferred by Article 31(b).
Cf. United States v. Williams, 2 USCMA 430, 9 CMR 60 (1953). However, it is
doubtful whether the draftsmen of the Manual intended to make such a distinction in the case of civilian police interrogations. In this connection, see
Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-9, The Law Officer, app. XVII
(August, 1954), where a recommended instruction to be given by the law
officer treats the "right against self-incrimination" as a shorthand expression
for the advice required by Article 31 (b). See also note 73, infra.
73. The draftsmen of the Manual had this to say about their rule: "Since
it would appear to be both logically and morally indefensible, from the
standpoint of making rules for determining the admissibility of confessions
and admissions, to require that the accused or suspect be advised of the
right against self-incrimination when he is interrogated or requested to
make a statement by persons who are subject to the code, but to dispense
entirely, and in every case, with such a requirement when he is interrogated
or requested to make a statement by persons (who may be military investigators) who are not subject to the code, the text of the Manual has been so
phrased that civilian military investigators not subject to the code, and other
investigators not subject to the code who are acting in an official capacity,
must give a warning in those cases of interrogation or request in which the
accused or suspect is not aware of the right against self-incrimination." LEGAL
AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS,

supra note 62, at 216. An Air Force board of review

reviewed the background of the Manual's rule at some length and rather
reluctantly concluded that a confession obtained from the accused by American civilian police in violation of that rule could not be admitted in evidence.
ACM S-5198, Wiser, 9 CMR 748 (1953). An Army board of review had
previously reached a contrary result without referring to the Manual's rule.
CM 353954, Franklin, 8 CMR 513 (1952), pet. for rev. and pet. for recon.
denied, 8 CMR 179 (1952). But see Department of the Army Pamphlet, supra
note 72, app. XVII. A Navy board of review has held that if civilian investigators employed by the Navy do not comply fully with Article 31 (b), the accused's
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refusal to accept incriminating evidence obtained by civilian investigators in violation of what was conceived to be the proper procedure
for interrogating a military suspect. A typical civilian police interrogation necessarily involves the application of substantial psychological pressure to make the suspect reveal all he knows. In this
respect it is doubtful whether civilian police interrogations are inherently less coercive than their military counterparts. Furthermore,
it is not amiss to observe that professional criminals do not find their
way into the armed forces. The serviceman who is "in trouble" for
the first time may be unusually vulnerable to demands for a statement, and the Manual appears to recognize that the military suspect's
right to remain silent means little unless he is aware of it. What the
Supreme Court has indicated to be one of the factors bearing upon
voluntariness 74 was thus converted into a strict prerequisite to admissibility.
The Court of Military Appeals has recently narrowed the apparent
scope of the Manual's exclusionary rule. In United States v. Grisham,7 5 the accused, an American civilian employed by the Department
9f the Army in France,7 6 was convicted by general court-martial of
the unpremeditated murder of his wife. Following this homicide,
the accused summoned the American military police to the scene.
They in turn notified the French police and, after making a preliminary investigation, surrendered the accused to the French who
exercised concurrent but primary jurisdiction over this offense. The
accused remained in French custody for approximately two weeks
but was ultimately returned to the American military authorities
upon their specific request. It was evidently understood that the
accused's return would not constitute a precedent in subsequent
criminal cases involving Americans. During the two-week period
the accused made two statements to a French police commissioner
and two statements to a French juge d'instruction. Apparently the
French interrogators had not advised the accused of his right against
self-incrimination. 7 Accordingly, the accused contended that the
incriminating statements must be excluded from evidence. NCM 181, Noel,
8 CAR 572 (1953).
74. See note 33 supra.
75. 4 USCMA 694, 16 CMR 268 (1954).
76. Persons serving with or accompanying the armed forces outside the
continental United States (and certain of its territories) are subject to the
Code and hence liable to trial by court-martial. UCMJ art. 2(11), 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 552(11) (1951).
77. The court so stated but the Army board of review indicated that the
record did not actually show the circumstances of one of the interrogations.
See CM 365320, Grisham, 13 CAR 486, 499 (1953). Before the French took
custody of the accused, the American military police had warned him in
accordance with Article 31(b) but there was no indication that the French
considered themselves bound by that Article. The court also observed that
the record did not reflect "any sort of coercion" and that the accused's four
statements were "voluntary in the traditional sense." Apparently the parties
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four statements should have been excluded from evidence under the
rule prescribed by the Manual. However, the court held that rule to
be applicable only where the civilian investigators were acting "in
furtherance of any military investigation or in any sense as an instrument of the military." The court then reviewed the circumstances surrounding the accused's four statements and concluded
that the statements were admissible under its view of the Manual's
rule. Although the opinion is not very clear, the court seemed to be
impressed by the fact that, at the time of obtaining the statements
from the accused, the probabilities were that he would be prosecuted
by the French rather than be surrendered to the American military
authorities.
The Grisham case does not indicate how the court's "instrumentality" test may be applied where American state or local police
officials conduct the accused's interrogation. The mere fact that the
civilian police were aware of the accused's military status does not
seem to be decisive of the need for a warning. However, American
civilian police frequently have informal working agreements with the
military authorities to deliver servicemen to the latter for prosecution. In such cases the civilian police may assume that any evidence
obtained during their interrogation will be turned over to the military
for possible use in a trial by court-martial. Presumably the "instrumentality" test is sufficiently flexible to exclude a confession obtained
under such circumstances, even though the military authorities may
not have known of or acquiesced in the interrogation of the particular
accused.

PROCEDuRAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY CONFESSIONS
Article 31 announces only the substantive principles governing
confessions and admissions. The task of prescribing the procedures to
be observed in determining their admissibility was left to the draftsmen of the 1951 Manual. In this connection, it will be recalled that
Article 36 (a) of the Code requires conformity, so far as practicable,
with the procedures followed in the federal district courts.
Briefly, paragraph 140a of the Manual requires the prosecution to
make an affirmative showing that the confession was voluntary, unless

the accused expressly consents to the omission of such a showing.
With respect to admissions, however, an affirmative showing is necessary only if there is an "indication" of involuntariness."8 In a general
to the court-martial did not initiate a full inquiry into the interrogations
conducted by the French juge d'instruction. Cf. note 21 supra.
78. This procedure was prescribed with a view toward the practicalities of
trial. See LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, supra note 62, at 216. It is frequently difficult to determine whether a particular statement amounts to an
admission, and in any event it would not be desirable to halt the trial for
a collateral inquiry into voluntariness each time a witness testifies to some
minor admission made by the accused. The Manual's rule does no more than
shift the burden to the defense to lodge an appropriate objection.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

court-martial, the accused is entitled to a preliminary hearing before
the law officer and outside the presence of the members of the court.7
The law officer rules on the voluntariness of the confession, but if he
rules that the confession is admissible, the issue of voluntariness
must later be submitted to the members of the court who, during
their deliberations on the findings, are free to come to their own
conclusions and accept or reject the confession accordingly. In addition, the court members may weigh the credibility of the confession
evidence.
The Manual's resubmission requirement raises some interesting
considerations. Paragraph 140a provides that the law officer's ruling
admitting the confession in evidence "is not conclusive of [its] voluntary nature. . . that is, the ruling is final only on the question of
admissibility." Although similar statements are often found in
judicial opinions, it should be observed that the Manual's provision
is to a large extent self-contradictory. By permitting the court members to consider voluntariness de novo, the law officer's ruling is not
final on what is almost invariably the only issue relating to the competency (admissibility) of the confession evidence. The logical impasse resulting from the resubmission requirement has been severely
criticized by Mr. Wigmore who contended that the correct allocation
of judge-jury functions demands that the voluntariness of the confession, as distinguished from its credibility, be determined finally by
the trial judge.s0 Under this view the jury would not be bound to
reject the confession even though they found that it had been obtained
involuntarily. However, a substantial number of state courts continue to require resubmission. 81 In the federal system, the Supreme
Court has never elaborated on the procedure to be followed by the
district courts, although its decisions do not appear to forbid resubmission of the issue of voluntariness. 82 Lacking any definitive expression of opinion by that Court, the federal courts of appeal have
adopted divergent views, some requiring resubmission and others
requiring final determination by the district judge.83
79, Although not specifically stated in the Manual, the Court of Military
Appeals has so held in United States v. Cooper, 2 USCMA 333, 8 CMR 133

(1953).

80. See 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 861; 9 Id. § 2550.
81. See Notes, 85 A.L.R. 870, 881 et seq. (1933), 170 A.L.R. 567, 580 et seq.
(1947).
82. See United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 39 (1951) ("The evidence
on the new trial will determine the necessity for or character of instructions
to the jury on the weight to be accorded the confession, if it is admitted in
evidence."); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896) (". . . the
question may be left to the jury with the direction that they should reject
the confession if upon the whole evidence they are satisfied it was not the
voluntary act of the defendant."). Cf. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1924); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 351 n. 1 (1943);
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 429 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
83. Resubmission required or permitted: United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d
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The Court of Military Appeals has acquiesced in the resubmission
requirement of the Manual, although it has held that the law officer
need not instruct the court members on their right to redetermine4
voluntariness where that issue has not been raised by the evidence.
Also, Judge Latimer has expressed hostility to this requirement in
cases involving only a disputed violation of Article 31 (b).85 The
Manual provides merely that the court members may reach their
own conclusions as to the "voluntary" nature of the confession. But
as previously noted, the term "voluntary" is used in the Manual as
a word of art; thus a confession is not voluntary if it was obtained in
violation of Article 31 (b). Since the Manual, consistent with the
language of Article 31, elsewhere regards a violation of Article 31 (b)
as being equally as serious, for purposes of its exclusionary rules, as
a violation of any other prohibition in Article 31, there is no reason
to suppose that different treatment was intended on the procedural
level.8" Apparently Judge Latimer has now altered his position, for
in a subsequent case he seemed to indicate that the question of
whether the accused understood the Article 31 (b) warning should be
87
resubmitted.
Another important procedural question, not discussed in the Manual
or yet decided by the court, involves the standard of proof which
governs the deliberations of the court-martial on the issue of voluntariness. Prompted in part by the Supreme Court's decision in Stein
v. New York, s8 the Army has recommended that its law officers instruct the court members that voluntariness must be shown beyond
a reasonable doubt.89 Shortly thereafter, however, an Army board
848, 852 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952)1; Patterson v. United
States, 183 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1950); McAffee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199, 201
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 310 U.S. 643 (1940). Resubmission unnecessary
or incorrect: Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 111 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir.

1940); Murphy v. United States, 285 Fed. 801 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 261
U.S. 617 (1923); Harrold v. Territory of Oklahoma 169 Fed. 47, 53-54 (8th

Cir. 1909). But cf. Litton v. United States, 177 F.2d 416, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1949).
Some of the cases fail to distinguish clearly between voluntariness and
credibility. E.g., Lewis v. United States, 74 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1934).
84. United States v. Smith, 3 USCMA 680, 684, 14 CMR 98,3 102 (1954) ; United

States v. Davis, 2 USCMA 505, 512-13, 10 CAR 3, 10-11 (195 )L There is federal

authority in support of this view. Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Acquino v. United
States, 192 F.2d 338, 356 (9th Cir. 1951); Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d
693 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also note 82 supra.

85. See United States v. Gibson, 3 USCMA 746, 764-67, 14 ChR 164, 182-85
(1954) (concurring opinion). His views on this question may have been
influenced by his service on the Supreme Court of Utah, which in 1943
adopted the procedure advocated by Wigmore. State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332,
142 P.2d 178 (1943). See also State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948).

86. See pp. 29-30, supra. The Army has adopted the view that a disputed
Article 31(b) violation must be resubmitted to the court. See Department of
the Army Pamphlet, supra note 72, app. XVII.
87. See United States v. Hernandez, 4 USCMA 465, 469, 16 CMR 39, 43
(1954) (concurring opinion).
88. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).

89. See 1953 JAG CHRONIcLE 237. The recommendation has since been
incorporated in Department of the Army Pamphlet, supra note 72, app. XVII.
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of review disagreed with this recommendation and held that the
instruction need not include any reference to a standard of proof.90
A review of the federal cases discloses that explicit holdings on this
point are almost nonexistent. In practice, the issue is generally submitted to the jury with the simple admonition to disregard the confession if they find that it was involuntary.0 1 In a few instances, the
reasonable doubt test has been incorporated in the instructions given
02
by the district judge.
The Army's recommended instruction seems desirable on policy
grounds. Appraised realistically, a confession which is accepted as
voluntary by the court members will effectively seal the accused's
fate in a case where it constitutes the only evidence of complicity
in a crime which has clearly been committed. Indeed, if the court
members find that the confession was made voluntarily, their oath
virtually obligates them to return a finding of guilty.. Accordingly,
any lesser standard would, as a practical matter, be inconsistent with
the reasonable doubt yardstick for determining the ultimate issue
of guilt or innocence. If the law officer fails to prescribe any standard,
it is quite possible that some members of the court will conclude not
only that a looser standard than reasonable doubt is to be used, but
also that the burden is on the accused, as the complaining party, to
establish involuntariness. 93 The accused's substantial rights may
thus be eroded by vague and unhelpful instructions.
REVIEW ExERcIsED BY THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
By statute, the reviewing authority of the Court of Military Appeals
SCOPE OF

is limited to questions of law.

4

However, in confession cases involving

a claim that basic constitutional rights have been infringed, the Supreme Court has, after some travail, finally held that it will reserve
the right to draw its own inferences from the undisputed facts relating
to the voluntariness of the confession, although it will not go further
The Supreme Court's opinion in the Stein case did not, however, intimate
that the resubmission procedure used in New York would have fallen short
of due process requirements if the issue of voluntariness had been submitted
under some lesser standard than reasonable doubt. The Army's recommendation was principally based on policy considerations plus an abundance of
caution.
90. CM 363294, Moses (Reh), 14 CMR 278, pet. for rev. denied, 15 CMR-

(1954).
91. See notes 82 and 83 supra; Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Op Cmi. L. REv. 317,
324-25 (1954).
92. See Mora v. United States, 190 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 1951); Patterson
v. United States, 183 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1950).
93. The Court of Military Appeals has noted the possible confusion which
may result where the law officer fails to instruct the court that it must acquit
unless convinced that the accused was sane beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Burns, 2 USCMA 400, 402, 9 CMR 30, 32 (1953).
94. UCMJ art. 67(d), 50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1951).
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and weigh evidence or otherwise resolve disputed factual issues.9 5
Under the Supreme Court's former, more passive approach, it would
not disturb the finding of voluntariness by the triers of fact if they
could reasonably have drawn different inferences from the undisputed testimony.96 It is noteworthy that the Court's jurisdiction to
draw its own inferences has been asserted in cases arising in the
state courts. There has been some slight suggestion that, in view
of its broad supervisory powers over the federal courts, the Court
may exercise an even more extensive scope of review over confessions
97
admitted in federal criminal cases.
The Court of Military Appeals occupies a position in the military
judicial system which is in many respects similar to that of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the lower federal courts. It seems that, in
providing for a civilian court, Congress intended that a leavening
influence would be brought to bear upon the administration of military justice,98 and the court itself has apparently recognized its
general supervisory powersP9 Accordingly, one would suppose that
it would not abdicate any reviewing authority which it might properly
assert in cases dealing with alleged violations of the important rights
secured by Article 31. Yet surprisingly enough, the court seems to
have unnecessarily narrowed its powers to review the voluntariness
of confessions.
The court's position was clearly stated in United States v. Webb,100
which involved a factual dispute concerning an unlawful inducement
allegedly offered by an Army CID investigator. After rejecting the
accused's contentions in this connection, the court stated:
"To fulfill our appellate responsibility, it is certainly incumbent on
us to review the circumstances surrounding the making of the
allegedly involuntary statement. However, where there is conflict in
the evidence as to whether imputed improper acts actually occurred,

or where conceded facts reasonablypermit varying inferences, the...
law officer-that is, the 'judge' of the court-martial-is not only
better equipped for the purpose, but labors under a legal duty to
weigh the evidence and to determine whether the confession is, in
fact, admissible. Indeed, we must accept his resolution of the question
of admissibility when it is supported by substantial evidence, regard-

less of whether we as individual lawyers might resolve the contro95. E.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98 (1948).

96. E.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602-3 (1944).
97. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187-88, 190 n. 35 (1953); Leyra v.

Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 589 (dissenting opinion).
98. See Senate Hearings,supra note 18, at 48-49.
99. See United States v. Woods and Duffer, 2 USCMA 203, 206, 8 CIR 3, 6
(1953), (concurring opinion). The concept of "general prejudice," requiring
automatic reversal of a conviction where there has been a failure to conform to
certain procedural innovations of the Code, seems based in large part upon
the Court's supervisory powers. See pp. 47-48, infra.
100. 1 USCMA 219, 2 CMR 125 (1952).
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verted question otherwise or draw other inferences from the facts."'l
(Emphasis added).

The court did not mention the decisions of the Supreme Court which
announce a contrary rule with respect to the power to draw inferences
from undisputed facts.
The more recent Hernandez case' 0 2 represents a logical extension
of the views expressed in Webb. In order to understand the holding
in Hernandez, it is necessary to advert briefly to the provisions of the
Code which define the powers of service boards of review. Article
66 (c) provides that a board of review "shall affirm only such findings
of guilty . . .as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on
the basis of the entire record, should be approved." This Article goes
on to authorize boards of review to "weigh the evidence, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact,
recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses." Thus
the powers granted by the Code far exceed those normally exercised
by appellate agencies; in effect, a board of review may retry the entire
case on the merits.
The Hernandez case involved an Army private of Puerto Rican
extraction who was convicted of raping a German girl. The issue
presented to the Court of Military Appeals was whether the accused's
confession had been obtained in violation of Article 31 (b) and therefore improperly admitted in evidence. The initial interrogation of
the accused was in the presence of the accused's company commander who testified that the interrogator, a CID sergeant, gave no
warning at that time. The accused seemed "surprised and shocked"
and stated that he thought the girl was making a false accusation. He
did not make any other statement during that interrogation. Three
days later, the CID sergeant conducted a second interrogation at which
only the accused and he were present. At this interrogation, the
accused made the confession which was received in evidence at his
trial. The CID sergeant testified that, before interrogating the accused, he had "read and explained" Article 31 to him; the accused,
however, testified that he had not been warned. The sergeant admitted that he had used "his own words" in writing out the accused's
oral confession, and the accused testified that he did not understand
many of the words contained in the written confession, as for example,
"sexual intercourse." Impartial defense witnesses testified that the
accused was eager "to do what you ask of him and please his su101. Id. at 222, 2 CMR at 128. For similar statements, see United States v.
Sapp, 1 USCMA 100, 102, 2 CMR 6, 8 (1952), and United States V. Monge, 1
USCMA 95, 98, 2 CMR 1, 4 (1952). The Monge case is criticized in 5 VAND.
L. REv. 640 (1952), and defended in McNiece and Thornton, supra note 2, at
168-69.
102. United States v. Hernandez, 4 USCMA 465, 16 CMR 39 (1954).
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periors" and that the accused's reading and conversational level was
that of a nine- or ten-year-old child.
It will be noted that this evidence raised a disputed issue of fact
as to whether the accused had been warned at all. But a second issue
was whether the accused had understood the warning. As to this, the
facts were undisputed; it was merely a matter of drawing the inferences from these facts. An Army board of review held, in the exercise
of its fact-finding powers, that the accused did not understand his
rights under Article 31 and, accordingly, that his confession should
not have been admitted in evidence. 0 3 Under the circumstances the
board's conclusion seems justified and the Court of Military Appeals
affirmed. However, the court apparently thought that it was powerless to do otherwise, for it stated, "Since there is substantial evidence
to support this finding by the board of review, it is binding upon this
0 4
Court."'
The court's rejection of the more liberal federal rule can have important consequences in cases involving a substantial period of confinement accompanied by protracted periods of interrogation, denial
of visitors, and the like. Although such intangible factors will normally permit different inferences as to voluntariness, the court's selfimposed restriction upon its reviewing authority does not readily
lend itself to the close supervision of police practices in the military.
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS AND THE HARmLESS ERROR RULE
Article 59 (a) of the Code sets forth the "harmless error" rule to
be applied in trials by court-martial. Under Article 59 (a), a conviction may not be reversed unless the error materially prejudiced the
substantial rights of the accused. Although Article 59 (a) appears
to announce a rule of general application, it is also apparent that the
constitutional overtones of Article 31 make adherence to its provisions
particularly important. The question thus arises: What corrective
action by appellate reviewing authorities is necessary where a confession obtained in violation of Article 31 has been admitted in
evidence before the court-martial? To put this question in the proper
perspective, it will be helpful to consider briefly the federal rule and
the military precedents developed under the Articles of War.
The federal rule. Until the recent Stein case, 0 5 decisions of the
Supreme Court appeared to stand for the proposition that it would
automatically reverse a conviction where a confession obtained from
the accused by coercion had been admitted in evidence against him.'0
103. CM 365300, Hernandez, 13 CMR 339 (1953).

104. 4 USCMA at 468, 16 CMR at 42.
105. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). For a thorough

analysis of the
Stein case, see Meltzer, supra note 91, at 339 et seq.
106. E.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 597-98 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945).
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Those decisions indicated clearly that the harmless error rule 0 7 was
not applicable. Although not necessary to its decision in Stein, the
Court nevertheless attempted to distinguish the earlier automatic
reversal cases and thus cast some doubt on their current validity.
The Stein case may reflect a new trend in the Court's attitude toward
involuntary confessions, but it seems doubtful whether the Court is
now prepared to overturn the rule of automatic reversal by permitting
a conviction to stand if the record contains compelling evidence,
apart from the tainted confession, to support the conviction. 03
The military rule under the Articles of War. In the Army, the
relationship of the harmless error rule to involuntary confessions was
well settled at the time the Uniform Code was enacted. In cases involving the reception in evidence of a confession which was the
product of actual duress, the accused's conviction was reversed regardless of the other evidence of guilt. 0 9 These holdings were based
on the automatic reversal rule announced in decisions of the Supreme
Court. However, a contrary result was reached where there was
merely a failure to advise the accused of his rights, as required by the
1928 Manual or, later, by the amendment to Article of War 24. In
those cases, boards of review analyzed the evidence of guilt aliunde
the improperly admitted confession and reversed only if such evi0
dence was not "compelling.""
Article of War 24 expressly excluded from evidence those confessions which were obtained by coercion or unlawful influence. It was
silent as to the disposition of confessions obtained in violation of its
warning requirement. Thus it might be argued that, for purposes of
measuring the gravity of the error, a distinction should be drawn
between a failure to warn and actual coercion or unlawful influence.
Article 31(d) of the Code, however, does not provide any apparent
basis for such a distinction. Coerced confessions, failures to warn,
and violations of the privilege against self-incrimination are all
lumped together. Purely as a matter of statutory construction, it is
difficult to contend that one type of violation of Article 31 should be
107. See pp. 52-53, infra.
108. A federal district court has rejected the argument that Stein overruled
the "automatic reversal" cases. Giron v.Cramer, 116 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash.
1953). See also Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,
6 STAN. L. REv.411, 425 (1954).
109. E.g., CM 337333, Burton (BR), 4 BR-JC 43, 53 (1949); CM 329162,

Sliger, 77 BR 361, 364-67 (1948)'; CM 328548, Yavonikis, 77 BR 131, 140-42
(1948).
A like result was reached in cases involving a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination at the court-martial. E.g., CM
346594, Mardiss, 1 CAR 283 (1951); CM 344026, Swinehart (BR), 10 BR-JC
11, 13 (1950); CM 343838, Smith (BR), 9 BR-JC 347 (1950); CM 326450,
Baez, 75 BR 231 (1947). It is to be noted that Article of War 37 contained a
harmless error rule similar to that in Article 59 (a) of the Code.
110. E.g., CM 342409, Woodall (BR), 8 BR-JC 69, 79 (1950); CM 336405,
Jonson (BR), 3 BR-JC 69, 75 (1949).
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treated differently from another. But on a more pragmatic level,
there are several countervailing considerations in the case of a violation of Article 31(b). First, a failure to warn does not ordinarily
affect the trustworthiness of the confession. Second, the interrogator's failure to warn will frequently be the result of inadvertence or
ignorance rather than a deliberate flouting of the accused's rights in
order to extract a confession at all costs. Finally, a mere failure to
warn is a far cry from police brutality and similar conduct considered repugnant to civilized society.
Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. Since the enactment
of the Uniform Code, there have been very few cases involving confessions obtained by physical coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. In fact, a case where such means have been
used is yet to reach the Court of Military Appeals; instead, it has
been required to reverse a conviction only because of a failure to warn
or a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
As previously indicated, more than one consideration may be
weighed in determining appellate disposition of an Article 31(b)
violation. However, in the Wilson and Harvey case, the court needed
only two sentences to adopt its version of the automatic reversal rule:
"Where-as here-an element of officiality attended the questioning which
produced the admissions, there is more than a violation of the naked rule
of Article 31(b) .. .; there is an abridgement of the policy underlying
the Article which must-we think-be regarded as 'so overwhelmingly
important in the scheme of military justice as to elevate it to the level
' To put the matter otherwise,
of a "creative and indwelling principle" ....
we must and do regard a departure from the clear mandate of the Article
as generally and inherently prejudicial."""'
Oddly enough, after declaring in these bold and unequivocal terms
that violations of Article 31(b) required invocation of the "general
prejudice" doctrine, the court took considerable pains to show that
the erroneuos admission of the incriminating statements amounted
to "specific prejudice," i.e., that the error was not harmless within
Article 59 (a) of the Code.1 2 This dualistic approach3 also appears in
a subsequent Article 31 (b) case decided by the court."1
The "general prejudice" holding in Wilson and Harvey came as a
distinct shock to the military, overturning, as it did, established precedent under the Articles of War. Most service boards of review
assumed that the court meant what it said and therefore embarked
upon a course of reversing any conviction where an incriminating

111. United States v. Wilson and Harvey, 2 USCMA 248, 255, 8 CMR 48, 55
(1953). For a discussion of the concept of "general prejudice," see Wurfel,"
"Military Due Process": What Is It?, 6 VAND. L. Rzv. 251, 281-85 (1953).
112. 2 USCMA at 255-56, 8 CMR at 55-56.
113. See United States v. Williams, 2 USCMA 430, 9 CMR 60 (1953).
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statement apparently obtained in violation of Article 31 (b) had been
admitted in evidence. 1 4 Other boards of review found ways of distinguishing Wilson and Harvey."15
The court evidently recognized the imperative need for clarifying
the scope of its "general prejudice" doctrine, and recent cases have
attempted to confine that doctrine within practicable bounds. The
court's attempts have been rationalized in two ways: first, that the
evidence does not adequately show a violation of Article 31 (b), and
second, that by failing to object at the court-martial the accused
waives his right to urge the alleged Article 31 (b) violation on appeal.
The Seymour n and Josey117 cases illustrate the first approach. In
Seymour, an admission obtained from the accused during an official
investigation had been received in evidence. However, the accused
had not objected and the evidence did not show whether he had
previously been warned of his rights. The Manual provides that the
mere fact that an admission, as distinguished from a confession, was
obtained during the course of an official investigation does not amount
to an "indication" of involuntariness.1 18 Thus the prosecution need
not make an affirmative showing of voluntariness, in the absence of
an objection by the accused. The court upheld the Manual's procedural rule and, there being nothing in the record to show whether
Article 31 (b) had in fact been violated, found the general prejudice
doctrine to be inapplicable. The subsequent Josey case enlarged on
this reasoning. There, the accused's incriminating statements had
been made under circumstances indicating that they had been
prompted by an illegal inducement offered by a CID investigator.
Accordingly, the Manual's rule required an affirmative showing of
voluntariness. The prosecution had failed to make this showing, but
the accused had not objected to the admission of these statements.
The court held that the evidence of record showed no more than an
"indication" of involuntariness and that a mere violation of the procedural requirements of the Manual was not a sufficient predicate for
the general prejudice doctrine. This being so, the overwhelming
evidence of guilt apart from the incriminating statements required
affirmance of the accused's conviction.
The second limitation of Wilson and Harvey is based on the principle of waiver resulting from a failure to object to the admission in
evidence of the incriminating statement. This principle would not,
114. E.g., CM 367761, Cox, 13 CMR 414 (1953); CM 365619, Dickerson, 12

CMR 512 (1953); CM 360348, Arista, 9 CMR 359 (1953); ACM 6745, Calandrino, 12 CMR 689 (1953).

115. ACM 6499, Danilson, 11 CMR 692, pet. for rev. denied, 12 CMR 204

(1953); ACM S-6031, Ketchum, 10 CMR 930 (1953).

116. United States v. Seymour, 3 USCMA 401, 12 CMR 157 (1953).
117. United States v. Josey, 3 USCMA 767, 14 CMR 185 (1954).
118. MCM 1951, f1 140a. See pp. 39-40, supra.
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of course, seem startling to the civilian lawyer. However, the 1951
Manual provides that: "[A] mere failure to object does not amount to a
waiver except as otherwise stated or indicated in this manual." 119
A similar statement appeared in the 1928 Manual.120 In prosecutions
under the Articles of War, the accused was frequently represented by
lay counsel whose ignorance or inexperience might jeopardize the accused's substantial rights. The waiver rule in the 1928 Manual was thus
intended to assure that boards of review would not be precluded from
considering errors committed at the court-martial. It did not purport to
require the appellate reviewing authorities to consider such errors.
Under the Uniform Code, with its requirement of legally qualified
counsel, the 1951 Manual's continuation of the former waiver rule
represents, to some extent, an anachronism in general court-martial
cases. The Court of Military Appeals at first indicated that it would
consider any error committed at the court-martial unless the accused
or his counsel had taken some affirmative action which amounted to
a waiver. Experience showed that this rule did not lend itself to the
orderly administration of military justice, and the court has relied
increasingly upon the stricter waiver rule commonly applied before
civilian appellate courts. In Article 31 (b) cases, the court now seems
committed to the general rule that the accused will not be permitted
to raise the alleged Article 31 (b) violation before it unless an appropriate objection was interposed at the court-martial. 12' However, the
court has stated that it will notice the violation where necessary to
do "substantial justice" or to prevent a "miscarriage of justice.' '122
The future of "general prejudice." The Court of Military Appeals
has not yet indicated that it is prepared to overrule its general prejudice doctrine in Article 31 (b) cases. On the contrary, the various
119. MCM 1951, I 154d.
120. MCM 1928, 126c.
121. United States v. Henry, 4 USCMA 158, 15 CMR 158 (1954); United

States v. Fisher, 4 USCMA 152, 15 CMR 152 (1954).

Chief Judge Quinn has

been the chief proponent of this view, with the somewhat grudging con-

currence of Judge Latimer who has never acquiesced in the general prejudice doctrine. Judge Brosman at first vigorously dissented from the application
of any waiver theory based on a mere failure to object, but he has since
joined the majority of the court. See his self-styled "swan song" in United
States v. Clark, 4 USCMA 650, 653, 16 CMR 224, 227 (1954) (concurring
opinion).
122. United States v. Fisher, 4 USCMA 152, 156, 15 CMR 152, 156 (1954).
Whether "substantial justice" can be done where the erroneous admission of
incriminating statements has specifically prejudiced the accused remains to
be seen. In this connection it may be noted that in Wilson and Harvey the
defense did not object to the admission of the incriminating replies made by
the accused. There, one of the witnesses identified Wilson at the court-martial

but could not identify Harvey. The prosecution did not introduce any other
competent evidence connecting either accused with the crime. As to the
accused Harvey, reversal was clearly demanded because of the insufficiency
of the evidence. As to the accused Wilson, however, it is arguable that
"substantial justice" might not require reversal although the error in admitting
his reply would not seem to be harmless. The court directed a rehearing as
to both accused without elaborating on this question.
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limitations on the apparent scope of the doctrine have been based
upon the assumption that it retains its vitality where the accused has
laid a proper foundation. Since the court has never expressly overruled any of its cases,'2 it is perhaps doubtful whether such drastic
action will be taken in this important area. However, the recent
holding in United States v. Morris, 24 involving the related field of
self-incrimination under Article 31(a) of the Code, is suggestive of
still another limitation which may be grafted on the general prejudice
doctrine. Prior to the Morris decision, it had seemed reasonably clear
that the court would automatically reverse where the accused's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated. 125 Perhaps because
of the constitutional derivation of Article 31 (a), the court did not
find it necessary to resort to the general prejudice doctrine in these
cases. Instead, it contented itself with statements such as, "Material
prejudice results as a matter of law" from a violation of the accused's privilege. 126 Putting conceptual distinctions aside, however,
the court's disposition of both Article 31 (a) and Article 31 (b) violations was substantially the same.
The facts in the Morris case were somewhat unusual. A general
court-martial had found the accused guilty of several offenses, including the larceny of a wristwatch which he had subsequently pawned.
His confession of the larceny was offered in evidence by the prosecution, and the accused took the stand for the limited purpose of testifying as to its voluntariness. He testified that FBI agents had "talked
[him] into making the statement," but on cross-examination he admitted that he had been warned of his rights and that threats of
force had not been used. The law officer thereafter received in evidence the confession, on which the accused had signed his name eight
times. A pawn ticket purportedly bearing the accused's signature
was also admitted in evidence. Upon the request of the prosecution,
the law officer in open court required the accused to write his signature five times on a blank sheet of paper. At the time, this action was
expressly authorized by the 1951 Manual.'27 Subsequently, however,
the Court of Military Appeals held that handwriting specimens were
123. This is not to intimate that the court has not been required to modify
some of its prior decisions. At times, drastic modifications appear to have
been accomplished by the expedient of overlooking inconsistent holdings.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Wycliff, 3 USCMA 38, 11 CMR 38 (1953), and
United States v. Clark, 2 USCMA 437, 9 CMR 67 (1953), with United States
v. Tubbs, 1 USCMA 588, 5 CMR 16 (1952).
124. 4 USCMA 209, 15 CMR 209 (1954).

125. E.g., United States v. Greer, 3 USCMA 576, 13 CMR 132 (1953).

The

generally accepted interpretation of the Greer holding appears in CM 366858,
Rice (Recon), 14 CMR 379 (1954).
126. E.g., United States v. Greer, 3 USCMA 576, 579, 13 CMR 132, 135
(1953).
127. MCM 1951, I 150b.
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protected by Article 31(a) and that the Manual's provision in this
28
connection was void.
An Army board of review reversed the accused's conviction
of larceny on the basis of the general prejudice doctrine, but it affirmed
the other findings of guilty and the sentence. 1 29 The Court of Military
Appeals, however, held that the accused's conviction of larceny should
have been affirmed, apparently relying on two separate grounds. First,
the accused's ill-fated attempt to show that his confession had been
obtained by unlawful means was turned against him. The court stated
that, as a result of this attempt, "it is distinctly arguable that [the
accused] is in no position to take advantage of the violation of [the
privilege against self-incrimination] found here."'130 Although not
articulated in the opinion, the court may have thought that the accused judicially admitted the genuineness of the signatures appearing
in his confession. Otherwise, it is hard to perceive the logical relationship between the accused's testimony for a limited purpose and
the subsequent violation of his privilege.
The second, and probably the most important, ground' 3' for the
court's decision was the cumulative nature of the handwriting evidence obtained in violation of the accused's privilege. The court
reasoned that, since the confession contained eight specimens of the
accused's signature, the five handwriting exemplars required by the
law officer constituted "not merely cumulative evidence, but repetitious evidence as well."'' 32 The court observed that it might reverse
where the record reflected a deliberate invasion of the accused's
privilege, but this was not the case here and the court could not
"discern the presence of any sort of purpose which would be served
133
by a retrial."'
Although the opinion in Morris was strictly confined to the factual
context of that case, the cumulative evidence test could serve a
salutary function in some Article 31 (b) cases. Frequently, the accused's admission of one isolated fact tending to incriminate him will
be confirmed by a mass of other undisputed testimony. Under such
circumstances the cumulative evidence test might prevent a reversal
128. United States v. Eggers, 3 USCMA 191, 11 CMR 191 (1953); United
States v. Rosato, supra note 15.
129. CM 365623, Morris, 12 CMR 510 (1953).
130. 4 USCMA at 213, 15 CMR at 213.
131. Although the court described its first ground merely as "distinctly
arguable," the next sentence stated that it was not necessary to base the
decision "entirely" upon that ground.
132. 4 USCMA at 213, 15 CMR at 213.
133. Ibid. As a matter of fact, it seems obvious that there would not have
been any retrial of this case since the board of review had affirmed the
accused's sentence on the basis of findings of guilty not contested before the
Court of Military Appeals. The Army apparently took the opportunity to
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of the conviction simply because the accused's incriminating admission was obtained in violation of Article 31 (b) and therefore erroneously received in evidence. A full confession, on the other hand, is
normally a most important factor in the case. Nevertheless, it might
be described as cumulative in certain instances, as where the accused
had made several other confessions which were properly admitted
in evidence or where the accused had judicially confessed before the
court-martial in the hope of obtaining a lenient sentence. 1 4 There
does not seem to be any substantial reason to distinguish between
violations of Article 31 (a) and Article 31 (b) in this respect. We have
seen that Article 31 (a) is not limited to judicial proceedings but may
be violated by compelling the accused to incriminate himself during
any official interrogation. As a result, the same incriminating statement might be obtained under circumstances showing that both provisions of Article 31 had been violated.135 But evidence obtained by
failing to warn the accused of his rights is certainly no more tainted
than evidence obtained through compelled self-incrimination. If
anything, the fact that a basic constitutional principle is embodied in
Article 31 (a) would seem to render its infringement somewhat more
serious than a failure to warn.
One other matter deserves brief mention. The cumulative evidence
test adopted in Morris appears to represent an uneasy compromise
between the general prejudice doctrine and the harmless error rule
in Article 59 (a) of the Code. In this connection, the court stated:
"Application of the so-called compelling evidence rule involves, in a
real sense, an evaluation of testimony and other evidence. However, no
evaluation whatever is required to support the conclusion that the Government's case with eight signatures would be no less compelling than
within any practical context, it would in
its case with thirteen. Indeed,
136
both instances be identical."'
The "compelling evidence" rule, referred to by the court, is merely
another expression for the military harmless error rule. As stated
in the 1951 Manual, that rule differs substantially from tho interpretation of the federal harmless error rule'3 7 in Kotteakos v. United
134. Judicial confessions are not unusual in court-martial practice, and the
1951 Manual contemplates that matter in extenuation and mitigation of the
sentence may be introduced prior to findings of guilt or innocence. See MCM
1951, f 137. The court has already indicated that a judicial confession will
preclude the accused from raising an alleged Article 31 (a) violation before it.
United States v. Hatchett, 2 USCMA 482, 9 CMR 112 (1953). But cf. CM
369937, Trojanowski, 15 CMR-

(1954).

135. See United States v. Rosato, supra note 15, and United States v. Welch,

supra note 15.

136. 4 USCMA at 213, 15 CMR at 213.
137. See FED. R. Cenvr. P. 52 (a).
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States.13s In the Kotteakos case, the Supreme Court held that the
significant consideration is whether the error actually had any substantial influence upon the verdict of guilty returned by the jury,
not whether the evidence unaffected by the error clearly establishes
guilt. However, the Manual provides that the test of prejudicial error
is whether "the competent evidence of record is of such quantity and
quality that a court of reasonable and conscientious men would
have made the same finding had the error not been committed."'139
In line with this test, service boards of review generally proceed upon
the assumption that, if the other evidence of record "compels" a
conclusion of guilt, affirmance of the accused's conviction is dictated. 40 The military harmless error rule seems to recognize implicitly that the findings of guilty returned by the court-martial do
not carry the same weight as a jury's verdict, since boards of review
have unusually broad powers to redetermine the facts.' 4' Nevertheless, it should be noted that in Article 31 (b) cases this rule tends to
ignore the fact that the court members may well have been influenced
by the otherwise voluntary confession made by the accused, regardless of the other compelling evidence of guilt. Moreover, by focusing
its attention upon the evidence in the record of trial, the rule does
not contemplate a practical appraisal of the harm actually done the
accused at the court-martial. The Morris case itself illustrates this
point. There, the accused's confession containing the eight signatures
was clearly not admitted for the purpose of establishing his handwriting; otherwise, there would have been little reason for the prosecution to request additional exemplars. It does not appear that the
law officer instructed the court members that they might compare
the eight signatures in the confession with the signature on the pawn
ticket. Accordingly, it seems quite probable that the comparison was
actually made by using the five exemplars obtained from the accused
in the very presence of the court members for the sole purpose of
proving his handwriting.
138. 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Although Kotteakos was decided under the prede-

cessor of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that Rule

was intended to be a restatement of existing law.
139. MCM 1951, 87c.

140. E.g., ACM 6499, Danilson, 11 CMR 692, 712, pet. for rev. denied, 12

CMR 204 (1953); CM 331849, Estrada, 80 BR 183, 196 (1948). In several cases
which did not involve violations of Article 31, the Court of Military Appeals
seemed to follow the federal harmless error rule but did not discuss the
differing military rule. See, e.g., United States v. Barcomb, 2 USCMA 92, 6
CMR 92 (1952); United States v. Kellum, 1 USCMA 482, 486, 4 CMR 74, 78
(1952). But cf. United States v. Fleming, 3 USCMA 461, 465, 13 CMR 17, 21
(1953); United States v. Doyle, 1 USCMA 545, 550, 4 CMR 137, 142 (1952).
141. See pp. 43-44, supra.
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CONCLUSION

This brief survey should make it apparent that the military law of
confessions is still in an evolutionary stage of its development. In
little more than three years, the Court of Military Appeals has been
confronted with many problems requiring delicate adjustment of the
legitimate demands of military law enforcement authorities and the
important rights secured by Article 31 of the Code. Although some
of its decisions seem open to criticism, the court has made a diligent
and conscientious effort to achieve a fair balance between these
conflicting considerations.

